The ‘Umayyad Comeback’ in Post-Assad Syria

Introduction

The sudden collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 shocked the world. After 50 years of rule and a brutal 13-year civil war, the government of Bashar al-Assad fell with surprising speed.

Into the resulting power vacuum stepped Ahmed al-Sharaa, the de facto leader of the new Syria. Formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, al-Sharaa leads Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the militant group that led the final offensive.

A key moment in this transition was al-Sharaa’s victory speech. He delivered it not from a government building, but from the famous Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. This location was a deliberate choice. It signalled the rise of a powerful new political narrative: the “Umayyad comeback.”

This narrative, pushed by official statements and social media, frames the fall of Assad as a historic restoration. It presents the new leadership as heirs to the Umayyad Caliphate, the first great Islamic dynasty that ruled from Damascus in the 7th and 8th centuries. The victory is described as a “purification” of Syria from the influence of the Assad regime and its Iranian allies. It promises a return to a “golden age” of Sunni Arab power.

However, this article argues that the “Umayyad comeback” narrative is a selective and political use of history. It serves the short-term goals of building a Sunni power base, legitimising the new leaders, and signalling a break with Iran. But it clashes with the historical reality of the Umayyads and the complex demographics of modern Syria.

The Umayyad era was not a model of unity. It was founded on civil war, relied on an exclusive political structure, and was destroyed by the very divisions it created. Promoting this history today threatens any chance of national reconciliation in a fractured country. By choosing a narrative of sectarian dominance over inclusive citizenship, the new leadership risks making Syria’s conflicts permanent.

The Umayyad Caliphate: A Legacy of Power and Division (661–750 CE)

To understand the modern “Umayyad comeback,” we must first understand the dynasty it copies. The Umayyad Caliphate saw huge territorial expansion and new ways of governing. But its legacy is one of conflict and social division, not harmony. The modern narrative’s romantic image of glory ignores the dynasty’s fatal flaws.

The First Dynasty: From Civil War to Monarchy

The Umayyad dynasty was born from the First Fitna (656-661 CE), the first major civil war in Islam. The conflict began after the murder of the third Caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, who was an Umayyad. His relative, Mu’awiya, the powerful governor of Syria, refused to accept the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Citing the need to avenge Uthman’s death, Mu’awiya challenged Ali’s rule. This led to bloody battles and shattered the community’s unity. The war ended with Ali’s assassination in 661, allowing Mu’awiya to take power. This conflict laid the foundation for the split between what would become Sunni and Shi’ite Islam.

Mu’awiya then made a radical change to Islamic governance. He broke from the tradition of choosing caliphs through community agreement and introduced hereditary monarchy. By making his son, Yazid I, his heir, Mu’awiya established a dynasty. Many saw this as turning the caliphate into a worldly kingdom (mulk).

Yazid’s succession in 680 CE triggered the Second Fitna (680-692 CE). The most infamous event of this war was the Battle of Karbala. There, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Husayn ibn Ali, was killed by Yazid’s forces. This event became the foundational story of martyrdom for Shia Islam and a symbol of Umayyad tyranny. The dynasty’s foundation, therefore, rests on violence and division.

The Arab Kingdom: Centralisation from Damascus

Mu’awiya moved the caliphate’s capital to Damascus, making Syria the empire’s power base. The strong Syrian army became the foundation of Umayyad strength.

The Umayyads, especially under Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705), launched a major program of centralisation and Arabisation. They made Arabic the only official language of government, replacing Greek and Persian. ‘Abd al-Malik also introduced the first purely Islamic coins, asserting the new Arab empire’s identity.

This process created a privileged Arab aristocracy that dominated the state. Key jobs were reserved for Arab elites, who enjoyed tax breaks. This led many to call the Umayyad state an “Arab kingdom” (mulk al-‘Arab), suggesting it prioritised Arab identity over Islamic universalism.

The Seeds of Collapse: Internal Conflicts

The Umayyads’ Arab-focused policies led to their downfall. A key failure was their treatment of the mawali, non-Arab converts to Islam. In theory, converts should have been treated as equals. In practice, the Umayyads treated them as second-class citizens. They were often paid less in the army and were forced to keep paying the jizya, a tax for non-Muslims. This created widespread resentment.

Adding to this problem were constant Arab tribal rivalries between the northern (Qays) and southern (Kalb) Arabs. Caliphs often played these groups against each other, which ultimately weakened the empire’s military and political stability.

The Abbasids, a rival clan, skillfully used these grievances. They built a revolutionary coalition of resentful mawali, Shia sympathisers, and alienated Arabs. In 750 CE, the Abbasid Revolution defeated the last Umayyad caliph. The historical record shows the Umayyad legacy is one of division, not unity.

Managing a Multi-Confessional Empire

The Umayyads ruled over a diverse population where Christians were often the majority. They managed non-Muslims through the dhimmi system. Christians and Jews were considered “People of the Book” and were allowed to practice their religion in exchange for paying a poll tax (jizya) and accepting a lower social status.

This approach was pragmatic. The Umayyads relied on the administrative skills of their non-Muslim subjects, and Christians often held important positions. However, this tolerance was not based on modern ideas of equality. It created a clear hierarchy with Muslims at the top, a model that clashes with modern ideas of an inclusive nation-state.

The New Syria: The Political Landscape under Ahmed al-Sharaa

The Syria that Ahmed al-Sharaa now leads is a nation shattered by war and sectarian wounds. To deconstruct the “Umayyad comeback” narrative, we must analyse its leader, its governance, and the demographic realities it faces.

The Political Transformation of Ahmed al-Sharaa

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s career is one of radical and calculated change. He began in the post-2003 Iraqi insurgency with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Sent to Syria in 2011, he founded the al-Nusra Front as Al-Qaeda’s official branch, which led the US to designate him a global terrorist.

A key turning point came when he publicly broke from global jihad. First, he resisted being merged into what became ISIS. Then, between 2016 and 2017, he formally cut ties with Al-Qaeda, rebranding his group as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This was a deliberate “Syrianisation” of his project. He dropped the goal of a “global caliphate” to focus on toppling Assad and ruling within Syria’s borders. This pragmatic shift was designed to win local support and seek international legitimacy.

Analysts describe al-Sharaa as a political chameleon: persuasive, flexible, and ruthlessly pragmatic. His main goal has always been to gain and keep power. His latest change, from a militant in fatigues to a president in a suit, is his most dramatic reinvention yet. This history suggests his current moderate stance is a political tactic, not a change of heart.

Governing a Fractured State

Before the 2024 offensive, HTS controlled Syria’s Idlib province through a quasi-state called the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). This body provided public services and collected taxes, creating some order. However, this state-building also involved authoritarian tactics, like suppressing dissent.

The HTS model in Idlib was pragmatic, especially compared to ISIS. HTS rarely enforced the harshest Islamic punishments, did not block women’s education, and even dismantled its religious police. This hybrid model blends the goal of an Islamic state with the methods of secular Arab authoritarianism.

Since taking Damascus, this public relations effort has intensified. Al-Sharaa’s government has pushed messages of unity, reconciliation, and protecting minorities. HTS has been formally dissolved to be integrated into a new national army.

Yet, this polished rhetoric clashes with events on the ground. The UN and human rights groups have documented credible reports of targeted violence against the Alawite community since the change in power. This gap between public messaging and the reality for minorities reveals a core contradiction in the new Syria.

The Syrian Mosaic: A Demographic Reality Check

Any narrative that defines Syria through a single lens clashes with its deep diversity. Syria is a mosaic of religious and ethnic groups, a reality the Sunni-centric “Umayyad comeback” narrative ignores.

Sunni Muslims are the majority at about 74%, but this group includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and others. The rest of the population is a mix of minorities. Alawites, Shia, and Ismailis make up around 13%. The Druze are another 3%. Syria’s ancient Christian community accounts for between 2.5% and 10%. Ethnically, Kurds are the largest non-Arab minority at 10%.

These groups are not spread evenly, creating distinct regional identities. This demographic reality is a major challenge to a narrative that favours one group’s history over all others.

This table shows the mismatch between the “Umayyad comeback” narrative and reality. A political project drawing its power from the history of Sunni Arabs is being applied to a diverse nation. This risks alienating over a quarter of the population and setting the stage for future conflict.

Deconstructing the ‘Umayyad Comeback’ Narrative

The “Umayyad comeback” is not a natural revival of history. It is a political narrative built for specific strategic goals. By comparing the real Umayyad dynasty with today’s political project, its purpose becomes clear.

The Symbology of “Umayyadism”

The narrative was launched with al-Sharaa’s victory speech in the Umayyad Mosque. This location is a powerful symbol of Umayyad power and the historical dominance of Islam in Syria. From there, al-Sharaa framed the victory as a “purification” from the “sectarianism” and “Iranian ambitions” of the Assad regime.

This theme has been pushed on social media by pro-regime influencers. This manufactured ideology, or “Umayyadism,” celebrates the dynasty’s imperial glory and its historical role as an enemy to Persia and Shia Islam. For example, a video of al-Sharaa on a horse was set to a song with the lyrics: “The Umayyads are of golden lineage / their name sent fear in Persian kings”.

This narrative is more specific and aggressive than the symbolism of the official opposition flag. The flag’s stripes represent multiple Islamic dynasties. “Umayyadism,” in contrast, elevates one specific dynasty, the one most tied to Damascus, Arab supremacy, and conflict with Shi’ism.

A Convenient History: Comparing Past and Present

The “Umayyad comeback” narrative works by highlighting parallels of glory while ignoring the deep contradictions between the 8th-century caliphate and the 21st-century Syrian state.

The Strategic Use of Nostalgia

This distorted “Umayyadism” is being promoted for its strategic value. Its functions are threefold:

1. Domestic Consolidation: The narrative is a powerful tool for building a cohesive Sunni identity (asabiyya) for a population that felt disempowered under Assad. It offers a sense of historical vindication and restored destiny.

2. Leadership Legitimisation: It elevates al-Sharaa and former HTS leaders from a controversial militia to the restorers of a glorious past. This historical frame attempts to overwrite their recent history with a more heroic identity.

3. Geopolitical Realignment: The narrative’s strong anti-Persian and anti-Shia tone sends a clear signal. It marks a definitive break from the Assad regime’s alliance with Iran. This positions the new Syria within the Sunni Arab sphere, appealing for support from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf.

The regime had other, more inclusive narratives available. It could have focused on the civic nationalism of the 1932 Syrian Republic or the cross-sectarian spirit of the 2011 uprising. The choice to elevate “Umayyadism”, a dynastic, imperial, and sectarian narrative, is a strategic decision. It shows the regime’s priority is not building a pluralistic state, but mobilising a sectarian base.

Implications for the Future of Syria

The “Umayyad comeback” narrative is a political act with dangerous implications. By defining the new state in exclusive and sectarian terms, the regime risks continuing conflict and paving the way for the country’s partition.

National Reconciliation vs. Sectarian Dominance

“Umayyadism” is inherently exclusive and threatens any chance of national reconciliation.

• For Alawites and Shia, the narrative’s anti-Shia tone is an existential threat.

• For Christians and Druze, it signals a potential return to second-class status, erasing the idea of equal citizenship.

• For Syrian Kurds, the Arab-centric identity ignores their language, culture, and political goals.

The narrative creates an unsustainable contradiction between the regime’s inclusive message for the world and its exclusive ideology for its base. This destroys trust and ensures the new Syria will be built on coercion, not consent.

The “Sunni Entity” and the Specter of Partition

“Umayyadism” could be ideological cover for a more pragmatic and dangerous project: creating a kayan sunni, or a “Sunni entity.” This theory is supported by al-Sharaa’s past statements about creating a “Sunni entity” in Idlib.

In this view, al-Sharaa may believe his best chance for power is not governing a diverse, unified Syria, but dominating a smaller, more homogenous Sunni state. This entity would likely stretch from Damascus to the former opposition heartlands in the north.

The non-Sunni regions, the Alawite coast, the Druze south, and the Kurdish northeast, might be offered a form of temporary autonomy. This would be a strategic pause, allowing the central Sunni state to consolidate power until it is strong enough to re-conquer these territories. The “Umayyad” narrative, with its history of imperial expansion, provides a ready-made blueprint for such a project.

Regional Impact and Lasting Conflicts

Adopting an “Umayyad” identity has immediate geopolitical consequences. It cements a hostile relationship with Iran and its allies, like Hezbollah. Syria is instantly transformed from a partner in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” to a key adversary.

Conversely, the narrative is designed to improve relations with the region’s Sunni powers. By positioning the new Syria as a shield against Iranian expansion, al-Sharaa is appealing to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. This could unlock needed financial aid and legitimacy.

However, this realignment comes at a high price. By defining itself in such starkly sectarian terms, the new Syria ensures it will remain a battleground in the broader Sunni-Shia cold war. It creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict, giving its enemies every reason to support subversive elements within Syria. The “purification” the narrative seeks can only be achieved through violence, ensuring the end of one civil war may simply be the start of another.

Final thoughts and considerations 

The “Umayyad comeback” narrative is a powerful but historically distorted and politically dangerous project. It uses a failed historical model of exclusive rule to govern a complex 21st-century state that needs inclusion to survive. The gap between the government’s inclusive international rhetoric and its exclusive domestic narrative is unsustainable.

For Syrian Actors:

• Challenge the Narrative: Syrian leaders must actively offer alternatives to “Umayyadism,” focusing on inclusive national symbols.

• Promote Inclusive Ideals: Advocacy should centre on the 2011 revolution’s principles of freedom and justice for all, and the civic ideals of the 1932 Syrian Republic.

• Pursue a New National Charter: This charter should be based on inclusive citizenship and decentralised governance, not a divisive past.

For the International Community:

• Condition Support: Diplomatic engagement and financial aid must be strictly conditioned on the government’s verifiable actions to protect all minorities and opposition, uphold human rights, and create a genuinely inclusive political process.

• Analyse Core Ideology: Policymakers must look beyond superficial changes and analyse the regime’s core ideology as expressed in its domestic messaging and actions.

• Support Civil Society: Direct support to Syrian organisations that promote a pluralistic, democratic, and non-sectarian vision for the country.

The world must not be fooled by a pragmatic facade when the underlying ideology speaks of sectarian supremacy. To accept the “Umayyad comeback” narrative is to ignore the lessons of history and risk condemning the Syrian people to another generation of conflict.